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I. INTRODUCTION
Africa is changing rapidly and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular
represents the region with the fastest growing population in the world,
abounding with young people yearning for opportunities and change.1 Yet,
this region also harbors many of the longest sitting presidents in the world,
each accumulating more than thirty years at the helmet.2 From Angola to
Zimbabwe, from Rwanda to the Congo, state leaders cling to power, often
The author is a Visiting Scholar at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law,
at the University of Oslo and Co-Chair of the European Society of International Law Interest Group on
Migration and Refugee Law. He has previously served at the Norwegian Immigration Appeals Board and
taught at the University of Oslo and at Boston University as a Lecturer in International Law and Visiting
Fulbright Scholar.
1.
Andrews Atta-Asamoah & Jean-Michel Severino, Head-to-head: Is Africa’s Young
Population a Risk or an Asset?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa25869838.
2.
Jason Hanna, Africa’s Current Longest-Serving Leaders, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/
2017/01/19/africa/africa-gambia-longest-serving-leaders/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2017, 3:13 PM).
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employing less than democratic techniques—from questionable referenda
and flagrant constitutional amendments to flawed elections and excessive use
of force—all with a view to defying the rules of democratic alternation,
pushing people to succumb or leave. What are the inherent reasons for these
state leaders’ behavior, why do they still succeed, what are the consequences
for those voicing opposition, and what role is there to be played by
international law in contributing to curtailing these seemingly unbounded
and perpetual presidencies—or is the alternative worse?
This paper aims at highlighting some of the most notorious cases of
close to unlimited governance, discussing underlying reasons for the status
quo and potential contributions international law may offer in terms of
safeguarding the human rights of the population and inducing a path towards
democratic alternation. On a related level, the article sets out to demonstrate
that the approach taken thus far towards African countries by international—
particularly European—actors with a view to stemming the flow of refugees
and irregular migrants coming to their borders is shortsighted at best, if not
utterly misconceived, even if moral considerations were to be set aside. As
both the lack of prospects of democratic alternation and migration are
interrelated, it is argued that only by addressing the former head-on, may the
demand or need for the latter be sustainably reduced.
Hence, after exemplifying the systemic problem of bad governance by
depicting a number of pertinent cases with similar traits of character situated
in Sub-Saharan Africa, this paper will regard the ensuing consequences of
this state of affairs through the lenses of refugee law—prior to discussing the
various steps taken in particular by European actors in reaction to these
consequences. Recognizing that addressing the causes of irregular migration
is necessary, but far from sufficient, the ensuing section will point to
underlying root causes as the explanans of refugee and migratory flows, and
look for ways to tackle those root causes.
II. BACKDROP SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, represents the region with the
youngest and fastest growing population in the world, yet also consists of
many of the poorest countries on the globe.3 At the same time, a number of
the longest-sitting state leaders display various common traits, aimed at
resisting democratic alternation, including flawed referenda, hasty
constitutional amendments, political violence, and other forms of exclusion,
thus resulting in some instances in a lack of alternation over the course of
3.
Mark Anderson, Sub-Saharan Africa’s Youth Population Offers “Enormous Potential”,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/nov/18/subsaharanafrica-youth-population-potential.

2017]

Syring

319

more than thirty years.4 Several countries which are negatively concerned in
that way will be depicted below, in a geographical fashion, traveling from
east to west.
A.

Angola

Angola adopted a new constitution in 2010, opening for the sitting
president, José Eduardo dos Santos, to ultimately sit for another ten years at
the helmet, despite having accumulated already more than three decades in
power.5 Historically, the head of the majority party automatically assumes
the presidency, which, in real and democratic contests elsewhere is neither
unusual, nor particularly questionable.6 Consequently, in a country
dominated by one party, controlled by one strongman, it effectively leads to
a freeze in alternation. To be true, the Constitution which, in many other
regards conveys the impression, at first sight, of epitomizing human rights
protection and modern division of power,7 also includes a clause according
to which the president may be removed by parliament.8 But for this removal
to happen, the Supreme Court or Constitutional Court, respectively, needs to
approve, and all judges of these Courts are and have been appointed by the
President.9 Furthermore, while the Constitution states that the president’s
term shall last for five years, and fixes the maximum length in office to two
terms,10 rendering former presidents who have already served two terms of
office ineligible for election11 and declaring constitutional referenda
impermissible,12 these are only ostensible hindrances. The president or one
third of the members of the National Assembly may initiate a revision of the
Constitution,13 which requires only a two-thirds majority in Parliament,14 and
would become effective without a grace period, such as an election cycle.
The enumeration of material limits to constitutional alternations is rather

4.
Ken Opalo, Term Limits and Democratic Consolidation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lesson
from Burundi, CONSTITUTIONNET (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/term-limits-anddemocratic-consolidation-sub-saharan-africa-lessons-burundi.
5.
Celia W. Dugger, Angola Moves to Make President Stronger, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/world/africa/22angola.html.
6.
Id.
7.
CONSTITUTION art. 2, §§ 1–2 (2010) (Angl.).
8.
Id. at art. 161(m).
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at art. 129, §§ 3–5.
Id. at art. 113, §§ 1–2.
Id. at art. 110, §§ 1–2(a–h).
CONSTITUTION art. 168, § 3 (2010) (Angl.).
Id. at art. 233.
Id. at art. 235, § 2.
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vague, and is silent with respect to term limits.15 Constitutional inertia or
other constitutional safeguards thus appear to be largely absent.
B.

Congo-Brazzaville (Republic of Congo)

In the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), the sitting president
Denis Sassou-Nguesso, already reigning for a total of more than thirty-two
years, aimed at preserving his grip on power by changing the Constitution of
2002.16 This Constitution stated that no one may be president for more than
two consecutive terms,17 and no one aged seventy years or more may be
eligible to stand for office.18 Sassou-Nguesso would, even if one were to
start the count of years after the 2002 constitution came into force, have
exceeded his term limits in 2016, and he had already turned seventy-two
years of age.19 Hence, Sassou-Nguesso pushed through a referendum in the
fall of 2015 with a view to changing those pertinent constitutional limitations,
intimidated the opposition—which eventually boycotted the referendum—
and claimed a more than ninety percent approval rate for the constitutional
amendment.20 The fact that voter turnout was probably below five percent,
did not bother him. Apparently, no minimum participation seems to be
required.21 Based on those results, the Constitution was changed, now
removing presidential age-limitations,22 and opening for three presidential
terms.23 Sassou-Nguesso thus claimed eligibility for yet another term.24
There were elections held with widespread repression and documented
electoral fraud, most opposition candidates were jailed or fled the country,
15.
See id. at art. 236.
16.
Congo backs Sassou Nguesso Third-Term Bid by Landslide, BBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34646310.
17.
CONSTITUTION art. 57 (2002) (Congo) (the Constitution was drafted in 2001, but adopted
following a referendum held on Jan. 20, 2002); cf. CONSTITUTION art. 65 (2015) (Congo) (comparing that
at that time, the term length was still seven years though).
18.
CONSTITUTION art. 58 (2002) (Congo).
19.
Grace Magu, Congo to Vote on Extending the Two Term Presidential Limit, FAMILY.TODAY
(Oct. 6, 2015), http://familynews.today/congo-to-vote-on-extending-the-two-termpresidentiallimitp1277153.htm.
20.
Congo-Brazzaville: 92% Des Électeurs Pour Une Nouvelle Constitution, RFI (Nov. 27,
2015), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20151027-congo-brazzaville-92-electeurs-favorables-nouvelle-constitut
ion.
21.
Id.
22.
Cf. CONSTITUTION art. 66 (2015) (Congo).
23.
Id. at art. 65 (distinguishing that the only concession was that presidential terms henceforth
would last for five instead of seven years).
24.
Congo-Brazzaville: Referendum Passes Allowing President to Extend Rule, ALLAFRICA
(Oct. 27, 2015), http://allafrica.com/stories/201510270558.html.
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and Sassou-Nguesso proclaimed himself winner.25 Apart from flagrant
violations even of established legal and constitutional provisions, no
constitutional inertia or other constitutional safeguards26 exist against what
James Madison once described as the danger of arbitrary government and the
current mores of oppressive majorities, or, as here, oppression itself.27
C.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Meanwhile, a similar attempt at extending the constitutionally
prescribed term limits occurred in neighboring DRC, where the sitting
president Joseph Kabila’s second and last reelection term was up in
November 2016.28 Unable to push constitutional changes regarding
presidential term limits directly through, which, according to Article 220 of
the Constitution of 2006, could not be the object of revision,29 he opted for a
subtle twist: the ‘glissement’, or ‘slip’.30 The argument goes as follows,
according to Article 70 of the Constitution,31 the president remains in power
until elections of a new president have been concluded.32 Hence, as long as
no new elections have taken place, which the current regime seems to do
everything to prevent, Kabila shall remain in power.33 Maximizing on this
vague definition, the president and his followers seem to have done
25.
Edward McAllister, EU and U.S. Condemn Post-Election Violence in Republic of Congo,
REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2016, 2:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-violence-idUSKCN0X5
1BV.
26.
E.g., CONSTITUTION art. 85 (2015) (Congo) (requiring a two-thirds majority in parliament
and/or the coming into force of any constitutional amendments not until after an ensuing parliament has
been elected). The president and members of parliament have a concurrent right to propose constitutional
revisions. If the president initiates a revision, and the Supreme Court (whose members according to art.
172 are appointed for life by the president) does not object, the revision proposal may directly be submitted
to a referendum. Hence, also the provisions of the Constitution of 2015 hardly qualify as constitutional
safeguards properly so called, see CONSTITUTION art. 172, 241 (2015) (Congo).
27.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
28.
Maud Jullien, DR Congo President Unlikely to Give Up Power, BBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35072001.
29.
Compare id. (the current president is suspected of staying in power past his presidential
term) with CONSTITUTION art. 70, 220 (2006) (Dem. Rep. Congo) (the length and number of presidential
terms may not be changed, and hence are fixed according to art. 70 to a five-year term, renewable once).
30.
William Clowes, DR Congo’s Joseph Kabila is Taking a Slippery Path to a Third Term,
QUARTZ AFR. (Dec. 9, 2015), https://qz.com/569612/dr-congos-joseph-kabila-is-taking-a-slippery-pathto-a-third-term/.
31.
CONSTITUTION art. 70, § 2 (2006) (Dem. Rep. Congo).
32.
Id.
33.
Cf. Xavier Monnier, L’art de Retarder Les Élections en RDC, Raconté Par l’un de Ses
Stratèges, LE MONDE (July 15, 2016, 9:29 AM), http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/07/18/l-artde-retarder-les-elections-en-rdc-raconte-par-l-un-de-ses-strateges_4971074_3212.html.
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everything to render the timely organization of elections even logistically
impossible.34 Demonstrations in support of respecting the constitution,
organizing elections, and requesting the president to respect the term limits,
were met with force, resulting in at least fifty-three deaths and several
hundred arbitrary arrests.35
When the opposition denounced such
interpretation as unconstitutional, and even appealed to the Constitutional
Court, the Court voted in favor of the president’s view.36 However, as it
turned out, the Constitutional Court’s judgment was unconstitutional itself
even if judged by its own standards and legal basis.37 The Constitutional
Court consists of nine judges, seven are needed for a quorum, but only five
were actually present—some had excused themselves as sick, others had left
the country.38 Meanwhile, the stalemate continued and it was only when the
National Episcopal Conference of Congo (CENCO)39 intervened that some
negotiations between opposition and governing party occurred, with a view
to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. The talks under the aegis of
CENCO eventually yielded an agreement, under the terms of which
presidential elections were to be held by the end of 2017, at which time at the
latest president Kabila was to resign definitely, the opposition was to get to
choose the prime minster, and the head of the Independent National Electoral
Commission (CENI)40 supervising the preparations for the long-overdue
elections.41 However, solution of remaining points of discord and, above all,
implementation of the terms of the agreement, have come to an impasse, with
the governing party continuing what appear to be stalling tactics. And with
every day that passes, CENCO is more likely to discontinue offering its good
offices, and preparations for the envisioned presidential election before the
end of the year—the paramount precondition of the agreement—less likely
to see the light of day. The recent death of Etienne Tshisekedi, the historical,

34.
Id.
35.
Cf. Violences de Septembre en RDC: L’ONU Accuse Les Forces de Sécurité, RFI: AFRIQUE
(Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161021-violences-septembre-rdc-forces-ordre-accusees-onu.
36.
David Kode, Movement Builds to Stop Congo’s President from Postponing Election,
WAGINGNONVIOLENCE.ORG (Dec. 2, 2016), http://wagingnonviolence.org/2016/12/congo-kabila-post
pone-election/.
37.
RDC: Les Juges de la Cour Constitutionnelle à Couteaux Tirés, RFI: AFRIQUE (Nov. 4,
2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161104-rdc-juges-cour-constitutionnelle-couteaux-tires.
38.
Id.
39.
Conférence Episcopale Nationale du Congo (CENCO).
40.
Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI).
41.
Cf. RDC: Signature de l'Accord Par la Majorité et l'Opposition, RFI: AFRIQUE (Dec. 31,
2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161231-rdc-majorite-opposition-cenco-kabila-joseph-eveques.
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most respected and uniting opposition figure, designated as head of CENI for
the period of transition, does not bode well for the further process.42
D.

Rwanda

Also, Rwanda has seen increasing repression and a decreasing political
space over the past few years.43 Long hailed as an exemplary country in a
Sub-Saharan, and post-violence context, and strategically playing the
‘genocide card’ whenever criticism towards human rights abuses at the hand
of the government mounted, the political situation in the country has adopted
most of the traits of a one-party state.44 There seems to exist no real
opposition to Paul Kagame, and claims to the contrary, such as pointing to
the so-called ‘Green Party’, the only registered and authorized opposition
party, appear to be a means of paying lip service to foreign donors.45 A recent
attempted visit by a foreign reporter demonstrated that the ‘Green Party’ was
barely visible in the streets, even its headquarters were hard to find, and
hardly staffed.46 In such an environment, Kagame pushed through a
referendum for a constitutional amendment removing the limitation of sitting
for a maximum of two terms as president.47 Taking a climate of repression
and control, reports of forced voting, and insufficient time to even debate the
amendments to the constitution into account, it is probably not surprising that
the majority of Rwandans approved these changes, now effectively allowing
Kagame to stay on for a total of more than thirty years.48 But is a
constitutional amendment, even if approved by a large majority, valid in such
a context? The idiosyncratic nature of the constitutional amendment,49
42.
Cf. Mort de Tshisekedi en RDC: Quel Impact Sur le Dialogue Politique?, RFI: AFRIQUE
(Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20170202-mort-tshisekedi-rdc-quel-impact-le-dialogue-politi
que.
43.
Omar S. McDoom, To Aid, or Not to Aid? The Case of Rwanda, UNITED NATIONS U. (Apr.
29, 2013), https://unu.edu/publications/articles/to-aid-or-not-to-aid-the-case-of-rwanda.html.
44.
Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda: Progress or Powder Keg?, 26 J. DEMOCRACY 19, 22 (2015);
World Bank: Economic Growth in Africa Down to 1.6 pct, DAILY SABAH (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.
dailysabah.com/economy/2016/10/04/world-bank-economic-growth-in-africa-down-to-16-pct.
45.
Bruno Meyerfeld, Au Rwanda, Les Opposants se Font Discrets, LE MONDE (Aug. 9, 2016,
11:41 AM), http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2016/08/09/au-rwanda-les-opposants-se-fontdis
crets_4980295_3210.html.
46.
Id.
47.
Jesko Johannsen, Rwandans Head to Polls in Controversial Referendum, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.dw.com/en/rwandans-head-to-polls-in-controversial-referendum/a18922926.
48.
Id.
49.
Cf. Filip Reyntjens, The Changes Made to Rwanda’s Constitution are Peculiar—Here’s
Why, CONVERSATION (Jan. 28, 2016, 9:25 AM), http://theconversation.com/the-changes-made-torwandas
-constitution-are-peculiar-heres-why-53771.
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tailored to one person only, Kagame, has been criticized for undermining
democratic change of government contrary also to article 23 of the African
Charter of Democracy, Elections and Governance, which states that “illegal
means of accessing or maintaining power constitute an unconstitutional
change of government and shall draw appropriate sanctions by the African
Union (AU).”50
E.

Burundi

The final examples of bad governance in this belt of African Great
Lakes countries pertains to Burundi, where the sitting president, Pierre
Nkurunziza, pushed through a disputed third mandate, claiming that the term
limits applied only to a president who, as required by the constitution, was
elected ‘by the people’, i.e. “by universal direct suffrage.”51 However,
Nkurunzizas first term came about through negotiations following the peace
agreements that ended the civil war in Burundi, and hence he was elected by
Parliament then, not by the people.52 But instead of having an open political
dialogue, as in the countries depicted above, a similar pattern of repression
and political violence emerged, where even judges on the Constitutional
Court apparently had been pressured to decide the question, raised by the
opposition, of an unconstitutional extension of term limits, as in line with the
president’s view.53 At least one of these judges soon afterwards fled the
country and reportedly applied for asylum.54
Furthermore, Burundi has in recent months refused to cooperate with
the United Nations (U.N.), including giving a group of experts, among them
the AUs Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Migrants and
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), access to continue their independent
investigations into the security and human rights situation in the country.55
50.
Cf. Ivan R. Mugisha, EU Questions Constitutional Amendment in Rwanda, E. AFR. (Dec. 4,
2015, 4:40 PM), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/EU-questions-constitutional-amendmentin
Rwanda/2558-2984382-gb8oyt/index.html.
51.
Cf. CONSTITUTION art. 96 (2005) (Burundi).
52.
Morgan Winsor, Burundi Elections 2015: President Nkurunziza Should Withdraw Third
Term Bid, Former Leader Says, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 4, 2015, 4:40 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/
burundi-elections-2015-president-nkurunziza-should-withdraw-third-term-bid-former-1907861.
53.
Edmund Kagire, Exiled Burundian Judge Sylvere Nimpagaritse Speaks Out, E. AFR. (May
7, 2015, 8:31 PM), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Exiled-Burundian-judge-SylvereNimpagaritse
-speaks-out/-/2558/2709602/-/j3371vz/-/index.html.
54.
See id.
55.
Matthew Russell Lee, From Burundi, UN Human Rights Experts Banned, Unable to Deploy,
OHCHR
Says,
INNER
CITY
PRESS
(Jan.
26,
2016),
http://www.innercity
press.com/burundi237banthirdterm012616.html; Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers,
Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons, AFR. COMMISSION ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS.,
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Based on what the experts had seen and researched thus far, the United
Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB) report stated, inter
alia, that there were serious reasons for believing that “gross human rights
violations [which may] amount to crimes against humanity” may have been
committed.56 The report was published in September 2016.57 A few weeks
later, the Burundian government announced that it would withdraw from the
International Criminal Court (ICC),58 the sole international court with
jurisdiction over international crimes, including crimes against humanity,
without limitations in terms of temporal or geographical scope, or official
capacity of the accused, for example as head of state or government.59
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF BAD GOVERNANCE
What the above countries have in common is that wherever possible,
they tried to at least give the impression of paying heed to constitutional
rules, basing changes to term limits or other constitutional provisions
benefitting the president and the ruling party on constitutional provisions
presumably allowing just that—without regard to the context and form in
which such changes could be regarded as legitimate. That some of these
provisions even opened for certain term extensions and other revisions that
may benefit the very government proposing the changes, without the
common constitutional safeguards of e.g. at least one electoral period
between the suggested revision and the coming into force of such changes,
may be regarded as a flaw in itself. But combined with an environment of
repression and abuse of power, precluding any meaningful political
opposition to the ruling party and discussion of the proposed changes, the
various modes of constitutional amendments may hardly be described as
legitimate from an objective point of view60—they would often more
appropriately be called constitutional coups d’état.

http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons/ (last visited Apr. 10,
2017).
56.
Cf. Rep. of the U.N. Indep. Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB) on Its Thirty-Third Session,
U.N. Doc S-24/1, at 14 (2016) [hereinafter Rep. of the UNIIB].
57.
Id.
58.
See Burundi: ICC Withdrawal Major Loss to Victims, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 27, 2016,
12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/27/burundi-icc-withdrawal-major-loss-victims.
59.
Other international courts with similar subject matter jurisdiction, such as the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) had their competences restricted in geographical (cf. ICTY Statute, art. 1) or temporal (cf. ICTR
Statute, art. 1) scope.
60.
See Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations, EVERYCRS
REPORT.COM (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R43166.html.
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Also, quite telling when it comes to the disregard of the true
(teleological) meaning of constitutional provisions are the lack of respect
paid to other, less visible provisions, or, more precisely, the creative
inventions in order to hide unconstitutional behavior. Article 96 of the
constitution of the DRC for example prohibits the president to be involved in
any professional activity during his terms in office, though not his family. 61
Recent research revealed that Joseph Kabila’s family had an interest in, and
often controlled, at least seventy companies, in almost any sector of
importance, from banking to agriculture, from petroleum and mining to
transportation and hotel business, in the DRC but also abroad, resulting in
contracts worth several hundred million dollars.62 Joseph Kabila himself is
associated directly only with two of these companies.63 But there seems to
be little doubt as to the origin of all the other family contracts, and even
Kabila’s diplomatic adviser, Barnabe Kikaya Bin Karubi, is quoted as
trivializing the results of that research by stating that there is nothing unusual
about the members of Kabila’s family having some advantages—after all,
it’s the presidential family.64
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the population strata, context of
suppression and meager outlook for improvement, many, and especially
young, people flee, migrate, or otherwise try to leave the area of conflict, and
move to neighboring areas or even beyond, seeking protection.65
A. Refugees and Migrants
While there is no universally accepted legal definition of migration, and
hence of ‘irregular’ or ‘forced migrants’, the latter are sometimes referred to
as “persons [either not having applied] for asylum [yet or] asylum seekers

61.
CONSTITUTION art. 96 (2006) (Dem. Rep. Congo).
62.
Michael Kavanagh, Thomas Wilson & Franz Wild, With His Family’s Fortune at Stake,
President Kabila Digs In, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
features/2016-12-15/with-his-family-fortune-at-stake-congo-president-kabila-digs-in.
63.
See id.
64.
See RDC: Bloomberg Révèle l’Empire Économique Bâti Par la Famille Kabila, RFI (Dec.
16, 2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161216-rdc-agence-bloomberg-revele-empire-economique-batifamille-kabila-president.
65.
Lucy Beck & Leo Dobbs ed., On the Run, Alone and Young: Congolese Children Flee to
Uganda, UNHCR (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2013/2/5113b67b6/run-alone-youngcongolese-children-flee-uganda.html; Esther Yu His Lee, The Huge Refugee Crisis That’s Already
Displaced 220,000 People, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 17, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/the-huge-refugeecrisis-thats-already-displaced-220-000-people-71e96cbb5ea0#.t1hiv48np.
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whose applications [were deemed] inadmissible.”66 The terms refugees and
migrants are often used interchangeably, not least in public and popular, and
certainly in populist discourse, and should be kept apart, especially when
discussing rights attached to the respective status.67 However, for the
purpose of the ensuing discussion, ‘irregular migration’ may be used to
encompass (often large) movements of refugees and migrants alike, as the
focus will be on the act of fleeing or migrating, not on the legal status
eventually sought, received, or denied. IDPs on the other hand could be
described as inhibited refugees, potentially having suffered the same
persecution as ‘conventional refugees’, but not having been able to cross an
international border.68 Hence, they are unfortunately easily overlooked as,
alas, also here not directly relevant to this article.
Whether one employs the European Union (EU) definition of a refugee
included in EU Qualification Directive 2011/95, the 1969 Organization of
African Unity (OAU) definition, or in the United States, section 101(a)(42)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), they are all based on the 1951
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Refugee
Convention as the common framework.69
“Refugee” means a third-country national who,

66.
Press Release, European Commission, Implementing the EU-Turkey Agreement—
Questions and Answers, RAPID 16/1221 (Apr. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Implementing the EU-Turkey
Agreement].
67.
‘Refugees’ and ‘Migrants’–Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), UNHCR (Mar. 16, 2016),
http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/3/56e95c676/refugees-migrants-frequently-asked-ques
tions-faqs.html; Joshua Keating, The Difference Between Refugee and Migrant Matters, SLATEST (Aug.
28, 2015, 10:56 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/08/28/the_terms_migrant_and_
refugee_should_not_be_used_interchangeably_the_difference.html.
68.
Key Migration Terms, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, http://www.iom.int/key-migrationterms (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
69.
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2016); Council Directive 337/9, art. 2, 2011 O.J. (L 337) 9, 13 (EU); G.A.
Res. 429 (V), at 48 (Dec. 14, 1950); OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems
in Africa, AFR. COMMISSION ON HUM & PEOPLES’ RTS. (Sept. 10, 1969), http://www.achpr.org
/files/instruments/refugee-convention/achpr_instr_conv_refug_eng.pdf.
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owing to [a] well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality or political opinion, [or membership of
a particular social group,] is outside the country of nationality and
is unable or, owing to such fear . . . is unwilling to avail himself
[or herself] of the protection of that country; or [a stateless person]
who, . . . being outside [of] the country of his [or her] former
habitual residence [for the same reasons as mentioned above,] is
unable or, owing to such fear, . . . is unwilling to return to it . . . .70

Additionally, so-called subsidiary protection may be available to a
person who does not qualify as a refugee but “in respect of whom substantial
grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned
. . . would face a real risk of suffering serious harm . . . .”71
B.

The Drivers of Irregular Migration

As had been stated e.g. in the aforementioned UNIIB report, but is valid,
mutatis mutandis, across the countries discussed above, and beyond the SubSaharan region, the civil war in Burundi that ended in 2005 had a devastating
effect on the economy and living standards.72 Following the Arusha
Agreement, Burundi experienced a period of some stability and sustainable
growth.73 The political crisis now, however, is reversing such progress.74
The climate of violence and repression has disrupted economic activity. 75
Half of the youth are estimated to be unemployed and the majority of the
demonstrators against the third presidential mandate were disenchanted
youth.76 Their high numbers may also provide a large source of recruitment
for nascent rebel and other armed opposition movements.77 But the latter is
just one additional concern as to what neglected or not appropriately dealt
with crises situations may lead to, also potentially regarding countries outside
the region, including overseas. However, as far as refugee and other
migration flows are concerned, the UNIIB investigations clearly “confirmed

70.

G. A. Res. 429 (V), supra note 69, at 48.

71.
María-Teresa Gil-Bazo, Refugee Status, Subsidiary Protection, and the Right to Be Granted
Asylum Under EC Law, 136 NEW ISSUES REFUGEE RES. (UNHCR) 1, 11 (Nov. 20, 2006).
72.
See Rep. of the UNIIB, supra note 56, at 14.
73.
Id. at 14–15.
74.
Id. at 15.
75.
Id.
76.
Rep. of the UNIIB, supra note 56, at 15. Employment here includes any kind of work, not
just work on a regular salary, which anyways pertains to only a tiny fraction of the work force.
77.

Cf. Id.
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the impact of the political crisis on the massive outflow” of people.78 It is
also in line with common patterns of drivers of migration.
In general terms, drivers of migration consist of push and pull factors.79
Push factors include armed conflict, in particular prolonged armed conflict,
where Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, but not least the conflict-ridden eastern part
of the DRC would be prime examples.80 Another strong, contributing push
factor is the political crisis, with, usually, concomitant political violence—as
is currently taking place throughout the Sub-Saharan region.81 As
exemplified above, political crisis often carries with it situations of
generalized or indiscriminate violence, individual insecurity, high
unemployment, economic breakdown, sometimes additionally driven by
natural disasters, utter lack of opportunity, and a sense of hopelessness.
These factors are often interrelated.
Pull factors often, but not always, represent the mirror image of push
factors, with protection, political freedom, security, access to health (care),
etc., looming large on the list.82
As may be seen, there is some reciprocity among push and pull factors.
Also, not all of these factors are related to or limited to ‘refugees’.
IV. ADDRESSING THE CAUSES OF REFUGEE CRISES
In September 2016, the United Nations General Assembly (GA) for the
first time in the so-called New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants
explicitly acknowledged a connection between crises situations, the rule of
law, or lack thereof, as well as marginalization, exclusion and the lack of
development and large movements of refugees and migrants.83 The GA
pledged to “work with countries of origin to strengthen their capacities.”84
Furthermore,

78
Id.
79.
Migration Push/Pull Factors, APHG CLASS WIKI (Jan. 9, 2016, 10:45 PM), http://lewis
historicalsociety.com/wiki2011/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=28.
80.
See, e.g., Root Causes of Migration—Fact Sheet, ONE AM., https://www.weareoneamerica
.org/root-causes-migration-fact-sheet (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
81.
The Sub-Saharan Security Tracker, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/africasub-saharan/sub-saharan-security-tracker/p37884 (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
82.
See Migration Push/Pull Factors, supra note 79.
83.
Draft for Adoption, U.N. (July 29, 2016), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/popula
tion/migration/events/ga/documents/2016/1August2016/Outcome_Declaration.pdf; Press Release,
U.N., New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants Adopted by all Member States at Historic UN
Summit, U.N. Press Release (Sept. 19, 2016).
84.
G.A. Res. A/71/1, ¶ 12 (Oct. 3, 2016).
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[r]ecognizing that armed conflict, persecution and violence,
including terrorism, are among the factors which give rise to large
refugee movements . . . [the signatories stated their intention] to
address the root causes of such crisis situations and to prevent or
resolve conflict by peaceful means [and to] work in every way
possible for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the prevention of
conflict and the achievement of the long-term political solutions
required.85

Acknowledging further that “[t]he promotion of human rights is also
critical,” the GA declared: “In addition, we will promote good governance,
the rule of law, effective, accountable and inclusive institutions . . . .”86
It remains to be seen what may come of such a GA Declaration, nonlegally binding as it is in character. Furthermore, while some of the ideas
expressed herein are laudable, there is reason to be concerned that the core
of the problem, here only stated as an addendum, as will be argued below,
will be overlooked or so vaguely defined as to be lost out of sight.
The current, prevailing way of addressing refugee flows may be
exemplified by the region experiencing an unprecedented increase in people
from the aforementioned and other crisis regions, including Syria, coming to
their door steps, and applying for protection or other rights of stay. In order
to stem the flow of new arrivals, the EU concluded an agreement with
Turkey, one of the main countries through which migrants and refugees to
Europe would travel, essentially offering money for border control, and
tightened frontiers.87

85.
Id. at ¶ 64.
86.
Id.
87.
Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration for Refugees and
Migrants, as United Nations, International Organization for Migration Sign Key Agreement, U.N. Press
Release GA/11820 (Sept. 19, 2016).
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Under the terms of the deal, all new ‘irregular migrants’—defined
as persons either not having applied for asylum or asylum-seekers
whose applications were deemed inadmissible—crossing from
Turkey to the Greek islands would be returned to Turkey. In other
words, for every returned Syrian (the largest group of ‘irregular
migrants’), another Syrian would be resettled to the EU from
Turkey directly. In addition, Turkey promised to “take any
necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes from Turkey
to the EU.” In exchange, the EU would allocate [three] billion
[euros] under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, with an
additional [three] billion [euros] to be mobilized by the end of
2018. Lastly, and perhaps the main motivating factor for Ankara
to enter into this accord, the EU promised an accelerated process
to lift visa requirements for Turkish citizens.
In parallel proceedings, the EU is also pushing ahead with a
migrant pact on Africa, offering similar incentives—a share in the
EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa—to a number of African
countries in exchange for stemming the flow of potential refugees
to Europe. The deal, already deemed “morally unacceptable” by
several human rights organizations, may also be questionable on
legal grounds.
Both the EU-Turkey and EU-Africa agreements include the
contribution of large sums of money to enhance the situation for
refugees already in the respective regions by creating employment
and development programs. Although this approach addresses
some of the root causes of migration, the problem is that it relies
heavily on partners that, at least in part, have a rather dubious track
record when it comes to the protection of human rights. These
regimes, due to their repressive nature, represent the very reason a
number of bona fides refugees try to leave. 88

And looking at examples from the recent past should suffice as a
reminder to tread carefully.
88.
Implementing the EU-Turkey Agreement, supra note 66; Susan M. Akram & Tom Syring,
Needed in Europe: A Comprehensive Plan of Action on Refugees, https://www.asil.org/sites/default/
files/documents/IRLIGblog_AkramSyring.docx (last visited Feb. 19, 2017) [hereinafter A Comprehensive
Plan of Action on Refugees]; see also Human Rights Organizations Slam New EU-Africa Migrant Pact,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (June 29, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/human-rights-organizations-slamneweu
africamigrantpact/a19365407?mc_cid=c9b2922399&mc_eid=1ca8e5dc24%20; Jeanne Park, Europe’s
Migration Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/refugees-and-the-displaced/europesmigration-crisis/p32874 (last modified Sept. 23, 2015); see generally European Commission Press
Release RAPID 15/6056, A European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (Nov. 12, 2015); European
Commission Press Release RAPID 15/5597, Refugee Crisis: European Commission Takes Decisive
Action—Questions and Answers (Sept. 9, 2015); The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, EUR.
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Prior to the ousting and death of Muammar Gaddafi, Italy and Libya
reportedly executed an agreement that compensated Libya in return for
cracking down on illegal migration routes stemming from, or in any case
leading through, Libya.89 That agreement included an opening for Italian
authorities to swiftly return intercepted boat migrants to Libya—a country
which is not a State Party to the Refugee Convention—before they could
even reach Italian shores.90 The agreement was criticized for not sufficiently
differentiating between illegal migrants and genuine refugees, and in many
cases not even having the necessary procedures in place for making a wellinformed decision in regard to refugee status determinations of the people
intercepted at sea before they were returned.91

COMMISSION: INT’L COOPERATION & DEV., http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergencytrust-fund-africa_en (last visited Feb. 19, 2017); Turkey Warns EU: Visa Deal or No Migrant Pact,
MIDDLE E. EYE (Apr. 21, 2016, 9:31 PM), http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-warns-eu-visadeal-or-no-migrant-accord-866776688.
89.
See Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s Forced Return of Boat Migrants and Asylum
Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 21, 2009)
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/09/21/pushed-back-pushed-around-0 [hereinafter Pushed Back]; see
also Italy to Pay Libya $5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/31/
world/europe/31iht-italy.4.15774385.html [hereinafter Italy to Pay].
90.
91.

Pushed Back, supra note 89; Italy to Pay, supra note 89.
Pushed Back, supra note 89; Italy to Pay, supra note 89.
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In the 2012 case of Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy,92 the European
Court of Human Rights, again sitting as a Grand Chamber,
reiterated the gist of the judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece,
and observed that “Libya’s failure to comply with its international
obligations was one of the facts denounced in the international
reports of that country. In any event, . . . the existence of domestic
laws and the ratification of international treaties guaranteeing
respect for fundamental rights [as in said bilateral agreement
between Italy and Libya] are not in themselves sufficient to ensure
adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where, as in
the present case, reliable sources have reported practices resorted
to or tolerated by the authorities which are manifestly contrary to
the principles of the Convention . . . . Italy cannot evade its own
responsibility by relying on its obligations arising out of bilateral
agreements with Libya.”93
The Court therefore unanimously held there had been a violation
of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights on the
part of Italy by exposing the applicants to the risk of being
subjected to ill-treatment in Libya and to being repatriated to
Somalia and Eritrea, the respective applicants’ home countries
from which they had fled.94
Concerns have also been raised that readmission agreements, even
where their conclusion would not be contrary per se to any
provisions of international law, contribute to potential violations
of refugee rights, including the denial of access to protection due
to the accelerated procedures of expulsion which generally form
part of such accords.95 Paying-off and redirecting refugee flows
in that fashion to countries less concerned with, or feeling less
bound by, the Refugee Convention—and the granting of rights
pronounced therein—jeopardizes the fairness of the asylum
system and thus the very idea underlying the concept of granting
protection to those in need.96

Hence, the EU should think carefully about not entering into new,
similar, potentially abusive, if not outright illegal, agreements—whether
under the guise of development aid or other cooperation.
92.
See Hirsi Jamaa & Others v. Italy, (No. 27765), Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2012); see also Tom
Syring, The Sirens and the Emperor: The European Union Between Attraction and Intervention, in STILL
WAITING FOR TOMORROW: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF UNRESOLVED REFUGEE CRISES 269 (Susan
Akram & Tom Syring ed., 2014).
93.
Hirsi Jamaa & Others v. Italy, (No. 27765), Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2012).
94.
Syring, supra, note 92.
95.
Id.; see also Mariagiulia Giuffré, Readmission Agreements and Refugee Rights: From a
Critique to a Proposal, 32 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 79, 79–111 (2013) (arguing that, in particular situations of
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Furthermore, what seems to be easily forgotten is that development aid
is not neutral; to the contrary, all development aid is highly political.97 As
has been pointed out elsewhere,
[D]onors . . . usually insist that this money is politically neutral,
that it does not directly benefit the political elite. This is true, as
most of the money is for schools, roads, health care, and water
projects. But all development is deeply political. By taking over
the financing of most public services, donors take pressure off . . .
the government to respond to the needs of its citizens. 98

While details of the EU migrant pact on Africa were still in the planning,
the EU-Turkey deal had already formally been in force for several months.99
It has led to a reduction of new arrivals, but the agreement continues to be
fragile.”100 And while the EU Trust Fund for Africa claims to aim at
addressing the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement and
irregular migration, there is little in the draft agreements that would promise
sustainable success, for lack of identifying and addressing the real underlying
problems at the origin of many of the countries’ deplorable state of affairs.101
V. ADDRESSING THE UNDERLYING ROOT CAUSES OF REFUGEE CRISES
Dr. Denis Mukwege, who for many years has provided help to “victims
of gang rape and brutal sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of
Congo,” said in his acceptance speech for the 2014 Sakharov Prize for
Freedom of Thought that “women’s bodies have become a true battlefield
and rape is being used as a weapon of war.”102 He also stated that “‘we have
spent too much time and energy fixing the consequences of violence. It is
time to take care of the causes,’ and called on the EU and its member states
informal border controls and massive and sudden arrivals of migrants and refugees—as in regard to
interceptions at sea—where monitoring procedures are generally lacking or insufficient, “the
implementation of a readmission agreement may contribute to hinder access of asylum seekers to
protection”).
96.
Syring, supra note 92.
97.

JASON K. STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF MONSTERS: THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONGO
(2012).
Id.
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See A Comprehensive Plan of Action on Refugees, supra note 88.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Sakharov laureate Denis Mukwege: “Women’s Bodies Have Become a True Battlefield”,
EUR. PARLIAMENT NEWS (Nov. 26. 2014, 1:24 PM), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/newsroom/20141125STO80503/sakharov-laureate-denis-mukwege-women's-bodies-have-become-a-truebattlefield.
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to use all instruments available to support resolving the conflicts in the
region.”103 Transferred to the question of alternation, the underlying reasons
for the causes, the root causes, appear to represent the real foundational issues
when it comes to solving not only the lack of democratic alternation per se,
but also irregular migration and refugee situations.
As long as
mismanagement, embezzlement, systemic corruption, rampant impunity and
a travesty of justice, of constitutions, and of elections are permitted, if not
encouraged to take place, alternation, a hoped for democratization, and
ensuing improvements for the countries affected is unlikely to materialize
any time soon. The fossilization of the political systems104, a prolongation
of the aforementioned perpetual presidencies and of bad governance will, in
turn, continue to have a devastating effect on the youth, on development, or
lack thereof, and hence contribute to a continuous need for and urge of
fleeing one’s country or migrating in search of a better future. And, should
the situation in any of the countries detailed above explode, or what is left of
a functioning state apparatus implode, taking the violent recent history of
especially the Great Lakes countries of Africa into account, there is a real
concern that the security situation in the entire region might severely
deteriorate and eventually collapse. Hence, western donors should have all
the incentives to identify and address the real, underlying root causes, instead
of opting for, or anyways focusing on, shortsighted ‘quick fixes’ and
concomitant outsourcing of migration control.105
VI. OUTLOOK—WHAT MAY BE DONE?
Many of the Sub-Saharan countries discussed above do have elaborate
and modern constitutions on paper—but abusive state leaders need to be
reminded of existing constitutional provisions and held accountable for any
unconstitutional changes. This cannot be done unless donors, the EU, AU,
and the United States, speak with one voice. In fact, in connection with the
flawed referendum in Congo-Brazzaville, changing the constitution, French
Prime Minister Francoise Hollande, when asked about it, answered in quite
vague terms, actually stating that he respected any state leader’s right to

103. Id.
104 Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Après les Coups d’État Militaire, l’Union Africaine à l’épreuve
des Coups d’État Civils, LE MONDE (July 15, 2016, 10:58 A.M.), http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/art
icle/2016/07/15/apres-les-coups-d-etat-militaires-l-union-africaine-a-l-epreuve-des-coups-d-etatcivils_
4969931_3212.html.
105. Joe Siegle, The Political Origin of Refugee Crises, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 26,
2004), http://www.cfr.org/world/political-origin-refugee-crises/p7054#.
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consult his constituency.106 There was no mentioning and no criticism of the
form and context of such ‘consultations.’107 Only after the equally flawed,
ensuing elections and their violent aftermath did the French Foreign Minister,
Jean-Marc Ayrault, eventually openly criticize Brazzaville.108 Given the
traditionally strong ties with and position in Congo-Brazzaville the former
colonial power France has maintained, a more candid, critical stance could
have made a difference.
Also, on the regional, EU level, there are tentative signs of becoming
more outspoken in the face of human rights violations or electoral travesties
of justice. Federica Mogherini, the EU Head of Foreign Affairs, e.g.
criticized Gabon for its recent election, the very limited access given to EU
election observers contrary to prior agreements, and indicated that the
confidence of the people of Gabon regarding the integrity of the electoral
process, may have been put at risk.109 Pushing for electoral observation
missions and speaking up, are important starting points, not least by thus
lending the opposition some witnessing eyes. But much more is needed.
Ultimately having the threat of pursuing and prosecuting state leaders’ most
egregious crimes before international courts up one’s sleeve, even if those
institutions for the time being are openly defied by the persons concerned,
may still have an effect, as would working with the AU towards regarding
constitutional coups d’état similarly critical as military coups d’état. All of
the above may take a long time to realize, but the perhaps most important
achievement would be a change of perspective, the realization and
acknowledgement that the underlying root causes of many a refugee crisis—
the denial of alternation—need to be focused on. And that could be
accomplished immediately.

106. Congo: La Position d’Hollande Sur le Réferendum Fait Polémique, RFI: AFRIQUE (Oct.
22, 2015), http://www.rfi.fr/france/20151022-france-francois-hollande-congo-brazzavillesurviesassoung
uesso.
107. Id.
108. Presidentielle Congo-Brazzaville: Fronde Internationale Contre le Dictateur, AFR. EDUC.
(Mar. 31, 2016, 11:05 PM), http://afriqueeducation.com/politique/presidentielle_congo_brazzaville_
fronde_internationale_contre_le_dictateur.
109. Cf. Gabon: L'union Européenne Ne Mâche Pas Ses Mots Après la Réélection D'Ali Bongo,
RFI: AFRIQUE (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160926-gabon-reelection-ali-bongo-unioneu
ropeenne-mache-pas-mots.

